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ACHIEVING THE AIMS OF OPEN JUSTICE? 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
COURTS, THE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC  
SHARON RODRICK∗ 
This article begins by outlining what the principle of open justice is 
intended to achieve. It then investigates the nature of the relationship that 
exists between the courts and the media, and between the media and the 
public, and suggests that these relationships are not always conducive to 
realising the aims of open justice. While the reporting role of the traditional 
news media will undoubtedly persist, at least for the foreseeable future, it is 
argued that, since courts now have the means to deliver to the public a 
fuller and truer picture of their work than the media can, they should seize 
the opportunity to do so. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Open justice is a utilitarian concept and is a means to an end, but not an end in 
itself.1 The chief object of courts is not to be open and accessible, but to 
ensure that justice is done according to law.2 In Re Hogan; Ex parte West 
Australian Newspapers Ltd, the Western Australian Court of Appeal decried 
the ‘tendency to identify the principle of open justice as the ultimate object, 
divorced from the rationale for its existence’.3 With that caution in mind, the 
first part of this article will outline what the principle of open justice is 
intended to achieve. The remainder of the article will examine how the courts 
(the object and focus of the principle), the media (the primary channel through 
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1 West Australian Newspapers Ltd v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 10 [30]. But see s 6 of 
the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), which declares that a 
primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open 
justice. Insofar as this provision treats open justice as an end rather than a means, it appears to 
be misguided. 
2 Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417, 437. 
3 [2009] WASCA 221 [32]. 
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which the work of the courts is made known), and the general public (the 
audience to whom it is made known) interact with each other. The aim of this 
examination is to ascertain whether the nature of these relationships is 
conducive to realising the aims of open justice and, if not, what possibilities 
exist for best achieving them. 
II THE RATIONALE FOR OPEN JUSTICE 
A An Oversight Function 
Historically, open justice has been lauded for its salutary effect on the quality 
of justice administered by the courts. Bentham regarded the principle as ‘a 
bastion against the arbitrary exercise of judicial power’.4 The same 
assessment has been made by numerous judges: ‘[a]n open court is more 
likely to be an independent and impartial court’;5 ‘[i]f the way that courts 
behave cannot be hidden from the public ear and eye this provides a safeguard 
against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy and maintains the public 
confidence in the administration of justice’;6 and openness ‘deters 
inappropriate behaviour on the part of the court’.7 Open justice has a similar 
disciplining effect on the behaviour of prosecutors and counsel.8  
The open court principle is not the only mechanism for ensuring that judges 
perform to an acceptable standard. Other important safeguards include: the 
existence of avenues of appeal; having appropriate procedures in place to 
ensure that judges are appointed on their merits9 and can be dismissed if they 
misbehave or lose their capacity to function properly; having appropriate 
                                                 
4 John Bowring (ed), Works of Jeremy Bentham (1843) vol 4, 316–17 as cited in Garth 
Nettheim, ‘The Principle of Open Justice’ (1984–86) 8 University of Tasmania Law Review 
25, 28. See also Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Attorney General [1982] 1 
NZLR 120, 122; R (On the Application of Binyam Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs [2010] EWCA Civ 65 [38]. 
5 Named Person v Vancouver Sun [2007] 3 SCR 253 [32]. 
6 Attorney General (UK) v Leveller Magazine [1979] AC 440, 450. 
7 R v Legal Aid Board; Ex parte Kaim Todner (a firm) [1999] QB 966, 977. See also Re 
Applications by the Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic) for Leave to Appeal (2004) 9 VR 275 
[25]; Television New Zealand v Rogers [2008] 2 NZLR 277, 312; Broadcasting Corporation 
of New Zealand v Attorney-General (NZ) [1982] 1 NZLR 120, 122; R (Guardian News & 
Media Ltd v City of Westminster Magistrates Court) [2012] EWCA Civ 420 [1]. 
8 Of course it is primarily the responsibility of the presiding judge to ensure that the other 
participants behave in a proper manner. 
9 See Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The State of the Judicature: An Address to the 28th Australian 
Legal Convention’ (1994) 20 Monash University Law Review 1, 8. 
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means to handle complaints about judges;10 and maintaining a clear separation 
between the judiciary and the other arms of government in order to preserve 
judicial independence. 
Open justice has also been acclaimed for its connection with the pursuit and 
attainment of truth. Blackstone and Wigmore both postulated that witnesses 
are more likely to be truthful if they have to testify in public.11 It is also 
claimed that openness in court proceedings may ‘induce unknown witnesses 
to come forward with relevant testimony’.12 Open justice also benefits 
litigants, not only in the aforementioned ways, but also because the public 
accessibility of the forum in which a dispute is resolved gives the victor a 
sense of public vindication. 
While treaties and bills of rights that enshrine a right to a fair and public 
hearing invariably confer this right on the litigants,13 enhancing the 
accountability of judges and witnesses does not benefit only those who 
become involved in legal proceedings. This is because judges are not merely 
umpires in a contest played out between parties in a courtroom.14 The laws 
that judges create, interpret and apply in the course of adjudicating a dispute 
have an impact that extends beyond the parties; they form precedents that bind 
the public. Therefore, the public has a collective interest in being apprised of 
whether the litigants were treated fairly and equally and whether the law was 
applied accurately, judiciously and impartially to produce a just outcome. In 
addition to treating the right of public access to the courts as fundamental to 
the administration of justice, it has also been argued that the public has a right 
                                                 
10 For example, New South Wales has a Judicial Commission which handles complaints about 
judges, and the Commonwealth has enacted legislation that deals with complaints handling 
for federal judges and magistrates: Courts Legislation Amendment (Judicial Complaints) Act 
2012 (Cth); Judicial Misbehaviour and Incapacity (Parliamentary Commissions) Act 2012 
(Cth).  
11 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (3rd ed, 1768) vol III, 373; 
Wigmore on Evidence (Chadborne Revision, 1976) vol 6, 436. See also DPP (Vic) v 
Theophanous [2009] VSC 325, [40]; West Australian Newspapers Ltd v Western Australia 
[2010] WASCA 10, [30].  
12 Gannett Co, Inc v DePasquale, 443 US 368, 383 (1979). But of course the opposite might 
equally be true; witnesses might be prepared to testify in private what they would fear to say 
in public: Max Radin, ‘The Right to a Public Trial’ (1931–32) 6 Temple Law Quarterly 381, 
384; Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation [1994] 3 SCR 835, 883. This will be 
the case if a witness perceives that telling the truth would imperil his or her safety. 
13 See, eg, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 14, Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, ETS 5 (entered into force 3 September 
1953) art 6. But note that Radin doubts that the principle was developed with the needs of 
accused persons in mind: Radin, above n 12, 384. 
14 Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, 448 US 555, 595 (Brennan J) (1980). 
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to know what the courts are doing because the judiciary is an arm of 
government.15 In this sense, public access to the courts ‘has a democratic or 
governmental aspect’.16 By contrast, a public that is unaware of what is 
happening in the courts has ‘no control over the courts and in effect, no 
control over the powers of the state’.17 
B An Educative and Confidence-Building Function 
Having established that the principle of open justice acts as a stimulus to 
appropriate behaviour on the part of the participants in a judicial proceeding, 
judges and jurists usually go one step further and explain that the accountable, 
impartial and well-functioning judicial system that openness is expected to 
produce engenders public confidence in the courts.18 It is said to be critical for 
preserving the rule of law19 and the stability of society that members of the 
public have confidence in the courts and are willing to submit to their 
authority, obey their orders and accept the outcomes, even when they are 
unfavourable to the individual, controversial or unpopular.20 Indeed, it is 
public confidence that ultimately gives courts their real legitimacy and 
effective authority, since courts have ‘no influence over the sword or the 
purse’, and the judiciary has ‘neither force nor will, but merely judgment’.21 
In the words of Burger CJ: 
The early history of open trials in part reflects the widespread 
acknowledgment, long before there were behavioral scientists, that public 
                                                 
15 John Doyle, ‘The Courts and the Media: What Reforms Are Needed and Why?’ (1999) 1 
UTS Law Review 25, 26. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Claire Baylis, ‘Justice Done and Justice Seen to be Done — The Public Administration of 
Justice’ (1991) 21 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 177, 184. 
18 This is somewhat of an article of faith, as public confidence in the courts is notoriously 
difficult to assess. See, eg, George Zdenkowski, ‘Magistrates’ Courts and Public Confidence’ 
(2007) 8(3) The Judicial Review 385, 398. 
19 Lord Neuberger, ‘Open Justice Unbound?’ (2011) 10(3) The Judicial Review 259, 260. 
20 See, eg, In Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2005] 1 AC 593, 607; 
R (Guardian News & Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2012] EWCA 
Civ 420 [1]. See also Re Hogan; Ex parte West Australian Newspapers Ltd [2009] WASCA 
221, [33] where the Western Australia Court of Appeal held that the exposure of court 
proceedings to the public scrutiny is essential for the maintenance of confidence in the 
integrity and independence of the courts. 
21 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay in Benjamin Wright (ed), The Federalist: 
The Famous Papers on the Principles of American Government (Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1961) 489 as cited in Susan Kenny, ‘Maintaining Public Confidence in the 
Judiciary: A Precarious Equilibrium’ (1999) 25 Monash University Law Review 209, 214. See 
also Stephen Parker, Courts and the Public (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration 
Publications, 1998) 15. 
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trials had significant community therapeutic value. Even without such 
experts to frame the concept in words, people sensed from experience and 
observation that, especially in the administration of criminal justice, the 
means used to achieve justice must have the support derived from public 
acceptance of both the process and its results.22  
… 
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, 
but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing. 
When a criminal trial is conducted in the open, there is at least an 
opportunity both for understanding the system in general and its workings 
in a particular case.23 
Openness secures public confidence only if the public approves of what it 
sees.24 In the event that members of the public are displeased with what they 
have observed, they are free to criticise the courts and agitate for change. In 
the celebrated words of Lord Atkin in Ambard v Attorney-General for 
Trinidad and Tobago:  
Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny 
and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men.25  
Public confidence in the courts depends on the public’s perception of the 
courts. Open justice makes it possible for the public to develop reliable 
perceptions through direct observation of judicial behaviour and the processes 
and outcome of a case.26 Therefore, the principle of open justice produces an 
outcome — the ‘bracing effect’27 it exerts on participants’ conduct — and 
allows the community to observe the result it has produced. It is therefore a 
concept in which cause and effect are intertwined. 
                                                 
22 Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, 448 US 555, 570–1 (1980). See also R E McGarvie, 
‘The Ways Available to the Judicial Arm of Government to Preserve Judicial Independence’ 
(1992) 1 Journal of Judicial Administration 236, 267; Doyle, above n 15, 26. 
23 Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, 448 US 555, 572 (1980). 
24 For some suggestions as to the conditions that must exist in order for the public to have 
confidence in the courts see Zdenkowski, above n 18. It should also be noted that different 
sections of the public will have different expectations: Enid Campbell and HP Lee, The 
Australian Judiciary (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 278. 
25 [1936] AC 322, 335. See also Home Office v Harman [1983] 1 AC 280, 316 where Lord 
Scarman stated that: ‘Justice is done in public so that it may be discussed and criticised in 
public’. 
26 Reports of judicial proceedings held in secret may still emerge, but they will be based on 
hearsay and speculation, and cannot be authoritatively confirmed or denied: Mirror 
Newspapers Ltd v Waller [1985] 1 NSWLR 1, 18–19. 
27 London Borough of Hillingdon v Neary [2011] EWHC 413 (COP) [15]. 
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The educative effect of open justice is diminished by the fact that members of 
the public rarely observe the judge or the witnesses firsthand. Instead, their 
impressions of a case are overwhelmingly mediated by the way in which it is 
reported by the media.28 To the extent that media reports are detailed, accurate 
and give a comprehensive account of typical cases that come before the 
courts, the media augment the educative effect of the principle; to the extent 
that reports and commentary are inaccurate, biased, ill-informed, superficial 
or sensational, their educative effect must be questioned.  
Media reporting can shape judges’ views of the public as well as the public’s 
view of the judges.29 While judges should never be swayed by public 
sentiment in reaching a decision, they are frequently called upon to apply 
community standards. Indeed, Judge Gibson has recently observed that, 
historically, judges ‘played an active role in identifying social mores’, and the 
general customs that judges observed were then reflected in their decisions, 
which formed part of the common law.30 The media are a significant avenue 
through which judges acquire an impression of community standards. 
C A Free Speech Function 
Open courts not only produce a quality of justice superior to that which is 
capable of being delivered by a secret court; they also advance free speech. 
Indeed, free speech and open justice are said to run parallel, although the 
latter is a much older principle.31 In this context, free speech has two 
interrelated aspects: the public has a right to receive information about the 
courts; and the media have a right to transmit that information to the public. 
Constraints on access to the courts or on the freedom to report what has 
occurred therein are likely to be resisted on the basis that they constrict both 
the media and the public’s right to freedom of expression. The principle that 
the public has a ‘right to know’, and that the media are the vehicle through 
which the public is apprised of what it has a right to know, is likely to be 
pressed by media organisations when they are resisting or challenging in 
camera or non-publication orders, or when they are seeking leave of the court 
                                                 
28 This idea is developed in more detail in the next section of this article. 
29 Robert E Drechsel, ‘Uncertain Dancers: Judges and the News Media’ (1987) 70(5) 
Judicature 264, 265. 
30 Judge Judith Gibson, ‘Should Judges Use Social Media?’ (Speech, 31 May 2013) <http://glj. 
com.au.ezproxy.lib.monash.edu.au/files/judgesandsocialmedia.pdf>. 
31 Jonathan Barrett, ‘Open Justice or Open Season? Developments in Judicial Engagement with 
the New Media’ (2011) 1 QUT Law and Justice Journal 1, 8. 
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to gain access to documents on the court record.32 That is, media 
organisations tend to view the justifications for open justice from a free 
speech perspective. They do not venerate open justice for its salutary effect on 
judicial performance and witness veracity, since it is neither the function nor 
the responsibility of the media to improve the judicial system.33 As explained 
earlier, it is the prospect of publicity that produces the discipline in the 
participants which, in turn, enhances the quality of justice. Open justice is the 
means to this end, and it is the means — freedom of expression — with which 
the media are concerned, not the effect.34 
Arguments along these free speech lines are most compellingly advanced in 
countries such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, each of 
which has a bill of rights that confers a right to freedom of expression. For 
example, the Supreme Court of Canada in Named Person v Vancouver Sun 
stressed the association between the open court principle and section 2(b) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which states that ‘everyone 
has the following fundamental freedoms: … b) freedom of thought, belief, 
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of 
communication’.35 LeBel J stated: 
The open court principle, which was accepted long before the adoption of 
the Charter, is now enshrined in it. This is due to the fact that the principle 
is associated with the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by s 2(b) of 
the Charter. It is clear that members of the public must have access to the 
courts in order to freely express their views on the operation of the courts 
and on the matters argued before them. 36 
In a similar vein, in Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Attorney-General), Cory J 
stated that 
members of the public have a right to information pertaining to public 
institutions and particularly the courts. ... It is only through the press that 
most individuals can really learn of what is transpiring in the courts. They 
as ‘listeners’ or readers have a right to receive this information. Only then 
can they make an assessment of the institution. Discussion of court cases 
and constructive criticism of court proceedings is dependent upon the 
                                                 
32 The media’s profit motive means that the alignment between the media’s interest and the 
public interest is not as accurate or altruistic as counsel appearing for media organisations 
might suggest. This idea is developed below. 
33 The role of the media vis-à-vis the courts is considered below. 
34 West Australian Newspapers Ltd v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 10 [30]. 
35 [2007] 3 SCR 253 [88]. 
36 Ibid. See also Ruby v Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] 4 SCR 3 [53]; Guardian News and 
Media Ltd, Re HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 1 [34].  
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receipt by the public of information as to what transpired in 
court. Practically speaking, this information can only be obtained from the 
newspapers or other media.37 
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, Brennan J of the United States 
Supreme Court stated that the court’s ‘special solicitude for the public 
character of judicial proceedings’ was ‘bottomed upon a keen appreciation of 
the structural interest served in opening the judicial system to public 
inspection’ and impelled by the ‘classic protections afforded by the First 
Amendment to pure communication’.38 
The Australian media are more constrained in their ability to argue along free 
speech lines, as Australian courts have been generally reluctant to accept the 
proposition that open justice is an aspect of free speech. The most overt 
statement to this effect was made by Spigelman CJ in John Fairfax 
Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court where he said that ‘the principle [of 
open justice] has purposes related to the legal system. Its purposes do not 
extend to encompass issues of freedom of speech and freedom of the press’.39 
Moreover, freedom of expression is not enshrined in a bill of rights and is 
protected only via an implication in the Constitution, and then only in relation 
to political communication. The upshot is that, in Australia, the principle of 
open justice remains more closely tied to its contribution to the administration 
of justice than in the United States or Canada.40 Conversely, in jurisdictions 
where open justice is an aspect of constitutionally protected speech, the free 
speech arguments are less anchored to the disciplining effect that open justice 
has on the participants in a trial than they are in Australia, and more focused 
on media organisations and the public as independent beneficiaries of the 
right of free speech.  
III THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEDIA, 
THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC 
Open justice has a very long history — so long, in fact, that its precise origin 
is unclear. In Terry v Persons Unknown, Tugendhat J described it as ‘one of 
the oldest principles of English law’, ‘going back to before Magna Carta’.41 In 
Raybos v Jones, Kirby J declared that ‘[t]he courts of England were open from 
                                                 
37 [1989] 2 SCR 1326, 1339–40. 
38 448 US 555, 592 (1980). 
39 (2005) 62 NSWLR 512 [60]. Contra Re Bromfield, Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte West 
Australian Newspapers Ltd (1991) 6 WAR 153, 164 (Malcolm CJ). 
40 West Australian Newspapers Ltd v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 10 [30]. 
41 [2010] EWHC 119 (QB) [106]. 
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the earliest times’, and pointed to evidence of the existence of open justice in 
both the Saxon and Norman periods.42 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc v 
Virginia, Burger CJ traced it back ‘beyond reliable historical records’.43  
The history of the news media is more recent. It is generally traced back to the 
development of the movable type printing press by Johannes Gutenberg in the 
mid-1400s. However, it was not until the 1600s that newspapers began to be 
published, and it was not until the development of the telegraph in the 1800s 
that news was able to be transmitted quickly across distances. The New 
Zealand Law Reform Commission observed that: 
The ‘news media’ has existed as a distinct commercial entity for only a 
relatively short period in historical terms. Its evolution is inextricably tied to 
the development of the commercial printing press in the 17th and 18th 
centuries.44 
Since the news media did not exist when open justice first developed, in its 
original inception open justice chiefly meant that persons were freely 
permitted to attend and watch judicial proceedings. It appears that people 
readily availed themselves of this opportunity. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc 
v Virginia, Burger CJ commented that attendance at court was once ‘a 
common mode of “passing the time”’.45 While courts today remain open to 
the public, very few members of the public choose to attend. The reasons for 
this are likely to be twofold: first, members of the public no longer have the 
time, opportunity or inclination to attend judicial proceedings;46 and, second, 
those who do have an interest in the courts can obtain information about their 
workings without the necessity of personal attendance, due to the 
technological developments that have made it possible for the media to 
rapidly disseminate information to mass markets. The upshot is that the direct 
relationship that once existed between the courts and the public has been 
                                                 
42 (1985) 2 NSWLR 41, 50–2. 
43 448 US 555, 564 (1980). See also Radin, above n 12. 
44 New Zealand Law Commission, The News Media Meets ‘New Media’: Rights, 
Responsibilities and Regulation in the Digital Age, Issues Paper No 27 (2011) [4.6]. 
45 448 US 555, 572 (1980). See also Lord Neuberger, above n 19, 268. For a fascinating 
account of public attendance at English courts over the course of time see Linda Mulcahy, 
Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of Law (Routledge, 2011) ch 5. 
46 See, eg, Police v O’Connor [1992] 1 NZLR 87, 95; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v 
New Brunswick (Attorney-General) [1996] 3 SCR 480 [23]–[26]; Sir Ivor Richardson, ‘The 
Courts and the Public’ (1995) 5 Journal of Judicial Administration 82, 89. Lord Neuberger 
has proffered some reasons for this lack of interest, including the ‘vast quantity’ of home 
entertainment, greater opportunities for travel and ‘the increased tempo of life’, which mean 
that court cases do not satisfy the demand for quick solutions: Lord Neuberger, above n 19, 
268. 
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largely displaced;47 the modern public relies heavily — often exclusively — 
on the news media to provide it with information about the courts.48 
Accordingly, it is not possible to engage in a serious assessment of the 
principle of open justice and its various manifestations without reference to 
the traditional media.49  
The rise of the mass media and their assumption of the role of intermediary 
between the courts and the public raise a number of questions about the nature 
of the relationship between the courts and the media, and the media and the 
public. This article will examine these relationships and their impact on the 
principle of open justice. It will also investigate whether any meaningful form 
of direct relationship exists between the courts and the public and, if so, 
whether it is capable of producing outcomes for open justice that are less 
likely to ensue when information about the courts is mediated by the media. 
It is important to bear in mind that, were it not for the principle of open 
justice, these questions simply would not arise, as it is the principle of open 
justice that has spawned the various access and dissemination rights that have 
produced this tripartite relationship. However, the principle of open justice 
does not prescribe how and by whom these rights are exercised. Moreover, it 
does not stipulate the responsibilities, if any, of those who choose to access 
the courts and disseminate information about them. Nor does it determine 
whether judges have any obligation to advance the principle of open justice 
other than to recognise and observe its requirements when acting in a judicial 
capacity. 
IV THE MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF THE MEDIA AND THE 
COURTS 
It has often been noted that the courts and the media enjoy a mutually 
dependent, even symbiotic, relationship.50 Where there are constitutional 
rights that support the media, the media depend on the court to be the 
                                                 
47 However, technological developments have provided the courts with an unprecedented 
opportunity to reinstate a direct liaison with the public. These developments are discussed 
below. 
48 The public also develops impressions about the courts from the entertainment media as well 
as the news media, primarily through watching television shows and movies that feature 
courtroom drama.  
49 The advent of Web 2.0 means that dissemination of court reports and commentary on the 
judicial system to large audiences is no longer the sole province of the traditional media.  
50 Justice John Basten, ‘Court and Media Relationships’ (Speech delivered at the National 
Judicial College, Beijing, 30 October – 4 November 2005) <http://www.lawlink. 
nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_basten301005>. 
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guardian and expositor of those rights.51 Even in Australia, which lacks an 
express constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, the media still 
depend on the law and the courts for the protection of free speech and bear the 
consequences when it is not accorded.52 On a more pragmatic level, the media 
are the beneficiaries of the ‘rich source of human drama’53 that court cases 
can be relied on to provide on a daily basis. 
For their part, the courts rely on the media to attend and report their 
proceedings to the public. Some judges readily acknowledge this dependence 
and have variously described the media as ‘the eyes and ears of the general 
public’,54 the ‘window of the courts to the world’55 and the ‘watchdog of 
justice’.56 Judge Brennan of the United States Supreme Court wrote that 
the Court has a concomitant need for the press, because through the press 
the Court receives the tacit and accumulated experience of the nation, and 
— because the judgments of the Court ought also to instruct and inspire — 
the Court needs the medium of the press to fulfill this task.57 
Similarly, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, while stressing the 
critical importance of an independent judiciary and an independent press to 
the upholding of the rule of law, emphasised the crucial importance to society 
of the engagement between the judiciary and the media.58 Other judges have 
embraced the role of the media in reporting the courts’ activities with less 
                                                 
51 In Pennekamp v State of Florida, 328 US 331, 335–6 (1946), Frankfurter J stated: ‘The 
freedom of the press, in itself, presupposes an independent judiciary through which that 
freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated’. 
52 One of the main bones of contention between the courts and the media in terms of free 
speech protection is the courts’ longstanding refusal to accord journalists an evidentiary 
privilege which would entitle them to refuse to reveal their sources in a court of law. 
Journalists maintain that the courts’ refusal to afford them such a privilege has a detrimental 
effect on free speech, as it disrupts the free flow of information to themselves, and ultimately, 
to the public. Recent improvements to the journalists’ position in a number of Australian 
jurisdictions have come from legislatures, not the courts. 
53 Roderick Campbell, ‘Access to the Courts and its Implications’ (1999) 1 UTS Law Review 
127, 128. 
54 Attorney-General (UK) v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 183. 
55 P D Cummins, ‘The Benthamite Principle of Open Courts’ (2007) 142 Victorian Bar News 
53, 55. 
56 Lord Denning, ‘A Free Press’ (1984) 17 Bracton Law Journal 13, 13. 
57 William J Brennan Jr, ‘Why Protect the Press?’ (1980) 18 Columbia Journalism Review 59, 
59.  
58 Lord Judge, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, ‘The Judiciary and the Media’ 
(Speech delivered at Jerusalem, 28 March 2011) <www.bfhu.org/images/download/lcj-
speech-judiciary-and-the-media.pdf>. 
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enthusiasm and would probably make admissions of reliance on the media in 
more grudging terms.59 
The fact that the media and the courts acknowledge their mutual dependence, 
whether positively or with misgivings, does not mean that there is a consensus 
regarding their respective roles and responsibilities or the extent, if any, to 
which they should work in conjunction with each other. Nevertheless, the 
nature of their relationship has implications for open justice and the degree to 
which it serves its intended purposes.  
A The Proper Role of the Media vis-à-vis the Courts 
While neither institution would baulk at the proposition that when the media 
report proceedings in the courts, they should do so in a fair, accurate, 
responsible and objective manner,60 what is likely to be contested is the 
proper role of the media vis-à-vis the courts. Are the media apologists for the 
courts? Should the media shoulder responsibility61 for educating the public 
about the courts? Or are the media simply free to treat the courts as a source 
of news? 
While it is theoretically possible that a judge might hold the view that the 
media should act as defenders of the courts, the overwhelming majority of 
judges appreciate that if the media are to fulfil their role as the fourth estate, 
such an alignment between the media and the courts should be neither sought 
nor desired.62 For their part, media organisations value their independent 
                                                 
59 That there is judicial disillusionment with the media is acknowledged in Justice Michael 
Kirby, ‘Improving the Discourse between the Courts and the Media’ (Speech delivered on the 
presentation of the Victorian Legal Reporting Awards, Library of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria, Melbourne, 8 May 2008). 
60 Journalists’ codes of ethics, broadcasting codes of practice and newspapers’ editorial policies 
inevitably espouse these principles. The existence of a qualified privilege for fair and accurate 
reports in defamation suits and the existence of a ground of exoneration from sub judice 
contempt for fair and accurate reports demonstrates that the courts expect (and reward) 
fairness and accuracy. 
61 The word ‘responsibility’ is not used here in a legal sense. Rather, it refers to a perception of 
the media’s proper role. 
62 See, eg, Sir Gerard Brennan, ‘The Third Branch and the Fourth Estate’ (Lecture delivered at 
the Faculty of Law, University College, Dublin, 22 April 1997) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/ 
assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/brennanj/brennanj_irish.htm>; Daryl Williams, 
‘The Courts and the Media: What Reforms Are Needed and Why?’ (1999) 1 UTS Law Review 
13, 15; Patrick Keyzer, ‘What the Courts and the Media Can Do to Improve the Standard of 
Media Reporting of the Work of the Courts’ (1999) 1 UTS Law Review 150, 151; Lord Judge 
(Speech presented at Society of Editors Annual Conference, Stansted, 16 November 2009) 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lcj-society-editors-nov-
2009.pdf >. 
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watchdog status and would undoubtedly fiercely resist being cast in the role of 
a ‘broadsheet’ for the courts, and rightly so. 
Whether the media’s proper role is that of independent educator or news 
disseminator is a more difficult question, the resolution of which has several 
consequences.63 One consequence pertains to selection. If the media’s 
function is to educate the public about the courts, one would expect that cases 
would be selected for coverage based on their significance to the public rather 
than their news value. Thus a tax decision that has important implications for 
the public would be reported over a decision concerning a trivial assault 
committed by a celebrity that has no real ramifications other than that it 
panders to public curiosity. Conversely, if the media are just after news, they 
will report those cases that possess ‘news values’.64 Research in the United 
Kingdom and the United States suggests that, more often than not, the media 
report extraordinary, newsworthy proceedings and tend to ignore ordinary, 
routine cases that may have educative value.65 
Discerning the role of the media also has implications for the manner in 
which cases are reported. As an educator, the media would be expected to 
provide detailed coverage of a case and to explain the process by which the 
decision was reached, not merely the outcome. They would also act as a 
forum for illuminating debate about the courts.66 On the other hand, media 
organisations that perceive themselves as entitled to treat the courts as a 
source of news fodder would not see themselves as educators, and may not 
assume an obligation to report a case in terms that convey the reasoning that 
underlies the decision or to explain its likely impact on the public. In fact, 
they might regard education and news as being at odds with each other. They 
might consider that a court that does not perform well or that delivers 
unpopular decisions creates more news than a court that hands down 
unobjectionable ones.67 Given that public confidence in the courts — one of 
the aims of open justice — is boosted by accounts that reflect well on the 
courts, it does not bode well for the courts if media organisations focus to an 
                                                 
63 Many of these consequences are elucidated in the panel discussion ‘Should We Dance? The 
Courts, the Community and the News Media’ (1996) 80(1) Judicature 30. 
64 For a discussion of what are generally considered to be news values see Jane Johnston and 
Rhonda Breit, ‘Towards a Narratology of Court Reporting’ (2010) 137 Media International 
Australia 47; Leslie J Moran, ‘Mass-Mediated ‘Open Justice’: Court and Judicial Reports in 
the Press in England and Wales’ (2013) 33(2) Legal Studies 1. 
65 Moran, above n 64, 10 citing research by William Haltom, Reporting on the Courts: How the 
Mass Media Cover Judicial Actions (1998) 168 and Keith Soothill and Sylvia Walby, Sex 
Crime in the News (Routledge, 1991) ch 4.  
66 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 44 [4.27]–[4.28]. 
67 It has been noted that if things are proceeding smoothly, the likely reaction from the media is 
a lack of interest: Zdenkowski, above n 18, 390.  
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unjustified extent on cases that expose the failures of the judicial system 
rather than those that showcase its successes.68  
It is difficult to gauge the courts’ opinion on the proper role of the media, 
since judges rarely express considered views on the matter. In truth, they 
probably harbour a range of private views. The media’s opinion on this issue 
is likely to vary according to the context in which the issue arises. This is due 
to the dual nature of media organisations which are generally privately owned 
and operated enterprises that, nevertheless, perform a public service.69 The 
tension between performing a public service and running a business for profit 
is considered in greater detail below. Suffice it to say that, when they are in 
court championing the public’s right to know, media organisations are quick 
to claim the role of educator, but when it comes to profit margins, they are 
likely to regard themselves as news disseminators.70 To the extent that the 
media eschew an educative role, the educative function of open justice is not 
adequately achieved. 
Thus far it has been assumed that the media are capable of operating as the 
primary vehicle through which the public is educated about the courts. Is this 
in fact the case? When one compares the modus operandi of the courts with 
that of the media, one might conclude that the latter are ill suited to act as 
purveyors of information about the former. Indeed, many judges are 
justifiably sceptical about the extent to which media coverage is capable of 
advancing the administration of justice and enhancing public appreciation of 
the work of the courts.71 The processes and rules of evidence are complex, 
often counterintuitive, and may be incomprehensible to an inexperienced 
journalist with no legal training.72 Judgments are the product of slow and 
                                                 
68 There is undoubtedly an educative function in exposing abuses and incompetencies within 
the judicial system. However, if media organisations focus solely or primarily on such cases 
— which are likely to be the exception rather than the rule — then the public confidence in 
the courts will be unnecessarily and unjustifiably shaken. 
69 Public broadcasters are funded by the government, but they are usually established as 
independent statutory authorities and operate at arms’ length from the government of the day. 
70 This statement assumes that there is a consensus within media organisations as to the proper 
role of the media. However, the reality is that reporters are more likely to perceive themselves 
as performing a public service, whereas editors and proprietors are more likely to prioritise 
the need for financial success. 
71 See R v Williams [2007] VSC 139; Kenny, above n 21, 222. 
72 The situation may not be as dire for media organisations that can afford dedicated court 
reporters. Over time, these reporters would acquire a familiarity with court processes and 
become adept at understanding the rules of evidence and reading and digesting judgments. 
However, the decline in profits, particularly in the print media, is being matched by a decline 
in dedicated court reporters: see, eg, Adam Wagner, ‘A Corrective to Bad Journalism’ (Paper 
presented at Justice Wide Open, Centre of Law, Justice and Journalism, City University 
London, 29 February 2012). 
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careful thought and reflection and are not easily understood or summarised. 
By contrast, the media’s modus operandi involves ‘an inbred preference for 
heat over light and simplicity over nuance’,73 tight deadlines, communication 
in sound bites and a penchant for advocating quick solutions to the most 
complex problems. Moreover, media reports ‘tend to cluster around particular 
moments in the court process’, such as verdicts and sentences, as these are 
‘moments of ultimate disposition’74 that satisfy news values such as 
immediacy, dramatisation and simplification.75  
Many have acknowledged that ‘the ways in which stories are told in court and 
retold by the media make a difference in how the law is understood’.76 For 
example, Johnston and Breit have observed that courts and media use 
different language — formal in the courts and vernacular in the media — a 
fact which is due to their professional routines but which can result in a re-
interpretation of the story by the media.77 Nobles and Schiff argue that the 
media and the law are two separate and closed systems of communication 
which simply cannot duplicate the meaning of each other’s communications.78 
Courts and media construct communications about an event on different 
bases: the media encodes social life as information or non-information,79 
whereas the law encodes it as legal or illegal activity.80 Because the media’s 
basis for selection is information, legal communications are simply events to 
be reported for their news or information value; they are ‘not reported by 
                                                 
73 T Mauro, ‘Five Ways Appellate Court Can Help the News Media’ (2007) 9 Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process 311, 312 as cited in: the Right Hon Beverley McLachlin, PC, 
Chief Justice of Canada, ‘The Relationship Between the Courts and the Media’ (Speech 
delivered at Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, 31 January 2012) <http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/court-cour/judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2012-01-31-eng.aspx>. 
74 Moran, above n 64, 20. 
75 Ibid, citing news values identified by Steve Chibnall, Law and Other News: An Analysis of 
Crime Reporting in the British Press (Tavistock Publications, 1977). It should be noted that if 
reporters are permitted to tweet from inside the courtroom, the cases they cover are likely to 
be reported on a more ongoing basis. While the limit of 140 characters in a tweet presents its 
own problems, which are identified below, the advent of live text communication from the 
courtroom is likely to generate reports that are less clustered around these ‘moments of 
ultimate disposition’.  
76 Johnston and Breit, above n 64, 49. The authors argue that, in light of this, the law and the 
media should pay more attention to narratives, narrative analysis and narrative theory. 
77 Ibid, 51–2. 
78 Richard Nobles and David Schiff, ‘A Story of Miscarriage: Law in the Media’ (2004) 31(2) 
Journal of Law and Society 221. 
79 More suitable terms might be ‘newsworthiness’ versus ‘non-newsworthiness’. 
80 Nobles and Schiff, above n 78, 226. See also Lieve Gies, ‘The Empire Strikes Back: Press 
Judges and Communication Advisers in Dutch Courts’ (2005) 32(3) Journal of Law and 
Society 450, 456–7.  
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reference to their meaning within law’.81 Nobles and Schiff maintain that this 
simply reflects the fact that there is no single reality of meaning: inevitably, 
legal events are assigned a different meaning in the law from that which they 
are given in the media.82  
These views were echoed by Justice Nicholson of the Family Court when he 
perceptively observed that the root cause of the state of unresolved tension 
that exists between the courts and the media 
lies in the fundamental difference of method employed by each. The 
methodology of the law is offended by the methodology of the media, yet 
each considers the search for justice is best served by the method which it 
employs.83 
B The Changing Tone of Media Coverage of the 
Courts 
There is widespread acknowledgement that recent years have witnessed a 
change in the way the media cover the courts. One reason is that we live in an 
age when the community demands greater accountability from its institutions, 
including the courts,84 particularly in liberal democracies where courts have a 
central role to play in protecting human rights.85 There has been a rapid 
decline in the respect accorded to judges and a greater readiness on the part of 
the media to engage in a critical examination of the courts, the judges and 
their decisions.86 This phenomenon is not peculiar to the Australian media. In 
1998, Justice Kirby observed that attacks on judges had become a ‘universal 
phenomenon’.87 The lack of restraint typically exhibited by users of social 
media has resulted in even more intemperate criticism of judges.88 Schulz has 
conducted a number of studies into coverage of the courts by sections of the 
                                                 
81 Nobles and Schiff, above n 78, 228. 
82 Ibid. 
83 R D Nicholson, ‘The Courts, the Media and the Community’ (1995) 5 Journal of Judicial 
Administration 5, 5. 
84 Williams, above n 62, 13. 
85 Mason, above n 9, 10. 
86 Justice Sackville maintains that there is nothing novel or recent about vehement criticism of 
the courts; it is just that the impact of criticism is more severe as a result of modern 
communications technologies: Ronald Sackville, ‘The Judiciary and the Media: A Clash of 
Cultures’ [2005] Federal Judicial Scholarship 6.  
87 M Kirby, ‘Attacks on Judges — A Universal Phenomenon’ (1998) 81 Judicature 238. See 
also Sir Anthony Mason, ‘No Place in a Modern Democratic Society for a Supine Judiciary: 
Former Chief Justice Attacks Attempts to Muzzle Judges’ (1997) 35(11) Law Society Journal 
of New South Wales 51. 
88 Gibson, above n 30.  
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Australian media and has detected a discourse of disapproval and disrespect 
and ‘a consistent pattern of reporting which inexorably demands that the 
justice system be modified’.89 The media’s tendency to delegitimise the courts 
led her to conclude that: 
It is no longer sufficient, or safe, to rely on traditional media to translate or 
deliver the information to the public, because they no longer just deliver an 
accurate record of events. Rather, court reports are now infotainment which 
is simplified by the use of the discourse of time to create a discourse of 
disrespect and control over the judicial process.90 
Open justice is not inimical to criticism of the judiciary and the courts; indeed, 
open justice facilitates critique — even encourages it — as a means of 
improving judicial performance where it is seen to be sub-standard. However, 
it was always taken for granted that the objective of the criticism was the 
pursuit of truth.91 Today, this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, Handsley has 
stated that ‘journalists do not typically see it as their role to provide a 
balanced, accurate picture of the judiciary and their activities’.92 If criticism is 
unfounded, ignorant and engaged in primarily for the sake of entertainment or 
a good story, this suggests that the principle of open justice is being exploited 
by the media to facilitate outcomes for the courts that gainsay what it is 
intended to produce. There are a number of such outcomes. First, inaccurate, 
uninformed, strident or even reckless criticism of the judicial system has a 
corrosive effect on public confidence in the courts and in the laws they 
administer.93 A tendency towards distortion by the media is particularly 
evident in the recurrent clamour over light sentences, where the media 
frequently fail to communicate to the public that punishment of an offender is 
not the sole purpose of a sentence and that judges are obliged by sentencing 
                                                 
89 Pamela D Schulz, ‘Rougher Than Usual Media Treatment: A Discourse Analysis of Media 
Reporting and Justice on Trial’ (2008) 17 Journal of Judicial Administration 223, 223. 
90 Pamela Schulz and Andrew Cannon, ‘Public Opinion, Media, Judges and the Discourse of 
Time’ (2011) 21 Journal of Judicial Administration 8, 18. It has also been noted that any 
delegitimisation of the courts by the media makes it easier for the other arms of government 
to encroach on the judicial role, because they believe they will have public backing in doing 
so: Chris Merritt, ‘The Courts and the Media: What Reforms Are Needed and Why?’ (1999) 1 
UTS Law Review 42. That such a tendency exists is evident in federal and state government 
reactions to the High Court’s decision in Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1. 
91 Kirby, above n 87, 241. 
92 Elizabeth Handsley, ‘The Media and Public Misconceptions about the Judiciary’ (2001) 6 
Media and Arts Law Review 97, 103. 
93 In fairness to the media, it is necessary to distinguish between ‘reportage of alarmist or 
extremist opinions by the media and expression of alarmist or extremist opinions by the 
media’. The media are entitled to do the former but should not do the latter: Keyzer, above 
n 62, 151. 
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legislation to attempt to achieve other purposes, including the rehabilitation of 
the offender.94 
Second, as explained above, the most important and longstanding rationale for 
the principle of open justice is that openness exerts pressure on judges to 
discharge their judicial duties in a proper manner because they know that they 
are liable to be exposed if they do not. However, proper behaviour on the part 
of a judge entails the judge acting in an unbiased way, capably, courteously, 
and attentively, not inappropriately questioning witnesses, properly explaining 
the law to the jury, properly applying the law to the facts, promptly handing 
down judgments and so forth. It does not demand the delivery of outcomes 
that draw accolades from the media. This does not mean that community 
reaction should be ignored — the principle of open justice endorses 
community sentiment as a disciplining force — but there is a critical 
distinction between being accountable for the proper performance of one’s 
duties and being popular or uncontroversial. To the extent that media reports 
castigate judges for decisions or sentences that fail to attract community 
approval, and to the extent that judges succumb to this pressure, open justice 
is not yielding the benefits that it is designed to produce. 
Third, a lack of public confidence in the courts brought about by media 
criticism makes it  
less difficult for the government of the day, or the legislature ... to introduce 
legislation which gradually restricts the discretion available to be exercised 
by a judge and eventually, in effect, instructs him on how his 
responsibilities should be exercised.95 
If this occurs, ‘how ... will the citizen be sure that when he takes on the 
government of the day, or the large institutions of the state, that [sic] the judge 
before whom the litigation is being conducted is truly independent of the 
government or the large institution’?96  
C The Judicial Response to Media Reporting 
Irrespective of the role of the media in reporting court proceedings and the 
extent to which their modus operandi affects their ability to do so, the fact is 
                                                 
94 See Karen Gelb, ‘Myths and Misconceptions: Public Opinion versus Public Judgment about 
Sentencing’ (Research Paper, Sentencing Advisory Council, 2006) [15]–[16]; Karen Gelb, 
‘More Myths and Misconceptions’ (Research Paper, Sentencing Advisory Council, 2008); 
WCB v The Queen [2010] VSCA 230 [15]–[29]. 
95 Lord Judge, above n 58. 
96 Ibid. 
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that the media remain, at present, the most significant bridge between the 
public and the courts.97 Accordingly, judges have had to decide how they will 
respond to this reality, both in their judicial capacity and in terms of the 
assistance they are willing to give the media.98 
1 How Judges React to Media Coverage in their Judicial 
Capacity 
Courts have developed exemptions from the law which are designed to enable 
the media to report court proceedings.99 These exemptions include a ‘fair 
reports’ defence to a defamation action100 and a ground of exoneration for sub 
judice contempt of court for fair and accurate reports of judicial 
proceedings.101 Special provision may also be made in legislation or rules of 
court for media representatives to inspect documents on the court record.102 
Judges can react to sub-standard media coverage of courts and cases in their 
judicial capacity only if legal boundaries are crossed. This will generally be 
the case only where a media organisation has breached a suppression order or 
committed a sub judice or scandalising contempt.103 A sub judice contempt is 
committed where a media organisation publishes something about a case that 
has a real tendency to prejudice the administration of justice in that case. A 
scandalising contempt is committed where a media organisation publishes 
scurrilous abuse of a judge or a court or makes unfounded allegations of bias 
and impropriety that have a tendency to imperil public confidence in the 
                                                 
97 Although many members of the public use the internet as their source of news, they are still 
most likely to visit sites that are operated by traditional media. However, this reliance on the 
traditional media may change over time. 
98 It is not being suggested that, when acting in a judicial capacity, judges have an unbridled 
discretion as to whether they will permit the media to have access to the courtroom or 
disseminate reports about cases. Rather, the focus of this section is on the provision of active 
judicial assistance that does not stem from the legal requirements of open justice. 
99 These exemptions are of general application, but have primary relevance to the media. 
100 This defence is now enshrined in the uniform defamation legislation, but it was originally a 
creature of the common law: Wason v Walter (1968) LR 4 QB 73. See Civil Laws (Wrongs) 
Act 2002 (ACT) s 139; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 29; Defamation Act (NT) s 26; 
Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 29; Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 27; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) 
s 29; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 29; Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 29.  
101 See Ex parte Terrill; Re Consolidated Press Ltd [1937] SR (NSW) 255; Hinch v Attorney-
General (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15; R v Sun Newspapers Pty Ltd (1992) 58 A Crim R 281; R v 
Herald & Weekly Times Ltd [2007] VSC 482. 
102 See, eg, Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 314. 
103 It is also open to an individual judge to institute a civil defamation action against the media. 
However, this is a decision for the individual judge and is not made on behalf of the judiciary 
as an institution. 
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courts. In Civil Aviation Authority v Australian Broadcasting Corporation,104 
Kirby J warned that the laws of contempt must not be employed as a means of 
eliminating poor or offensive journalism. In circumstances where there is no 
detriment to the administration of justice, the courts must resist the temptation 
to impose quality controls on the media and must permit the media to choose 
how they will report on cases or on the courts in general. In a similar vein, 
albeit in a different context, in Guardian News and Media Ltd in Her 
Majesty’s Treasury v Ahmed, the United Kingdom Supreme Court affirmed 
that judges recognise that  
editors know best how to present material in a way that will interest the 
readers of their particular publication and so help them to absorb the 
information. A requirement to report it in some austere, abstract form, 
devoid of much of its human interest, could well mean that the report would 
not be read and the information would not be passed on. Ultimately, such an 
approach could threaten the viability of newspapers and magazines, which 
can only inform the public if they attract enough readers and make enough 
money to survive.105 
2 Extra Judicial Action to Assist the Media 
Traditionally, the courts have remained distant and aloof from the media, and 
have been reluctant to assist them to act as an intermediary between 
themselves and the public. Judges have traditionally not made themselves 
available for media interviews nor responded to media criticism,106 choosing 
to speak only through their judgments,107 and courts have customarily not 
conducted their operations with the needs of the media in mind. This 
detachment was regarded by courts as necessary to preserve judicial 
impartiality. It traditionally fell to the Attorney-General as Chief Legal 
Officer of the Crown to defend the judiciary against unwarranted attack by the 
                                                 
104 (1995) 39 NSWLR 540, 556–7. 
105 [2010] UKSC 1 [63]. 
106 This practice was given formal status in a letter written by the Lord Chancellor, Lord 
Kilmuir, in 1955. The Lord Chancellor’s edict became known as the Kilmuir rules. The letter 
was understood to apply to all media, even though it was addressed only to the Director-
General of the BBC. The rules are reproduced, with comment, in A W Bradley, ‘Judges and 
the Media — The Kilmuir Rules’ [1986] Public Law 383. See also Sir Daryl Dawson, ‘Judges 
and the Media’ (1987) 10 University of New South Wales Law Journal 17; John Harber 
Phillips, ‘The Judiciary and the Media’ (1994) 20 Monash University Law Review 12, 12–13. 
The Kilmuir Rules were abandoned in 1987 during the Lord Chancellorship of Lord MacKay 
and are no longer followed in Australia: Nicholson, above n 83, 8. 
107 Of course judgments only address the legal issues that fall to be resolved in the case; they do 
not canvass wider issues concerning the role of the courts, court processes, the state of the law 
and so forth. 
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media or other branches of government. However, this role appears to be in 
decline.108  
In the 1990s, the nature of the courts’ interaction with the media began to 
undergo considerable change. Judges are now more likely to agree to be 
interviewed about the work of the courts109 and to respond to criticism,110 
although opinions differ over the precise circumstances in which it is 
appropriate for judges to do so.111 Courts are becoming progressively more 
pro-active in their relationship with the media and most have accorded the 
media a number of privileges and entitlements that exceed those enjoyed by 
the general public.  
                                                 
108 Former Attorney-General Daryl Williams did not regard defence of the judiciary as a 
legitimate role of the Attorney-General, largely because of the political nature of the 
Attorney-General’s office: Daryl Williams, ‘Opening Ceremony Address’ (Speech Delivered 
at Judicial Conference of Australia Colloquium 2001, Ayers Rock Resort, Uluru, 7 April 
2001) <http://www.jca.asn.au/attachments/williams.pdf>. Contra Gerard Carney, ‘Comment 
— The Role of the Attorney-General’ (1997) 9(1) Bond Law Review 8; Sir Gerard Brennan, 
‘The State of the Judicature’ (1998) 72 Australian Law Journal 33, 41; Alana McCarthy, ‘The 
Evolution of the Role of the Attorney-General’ (2004) 11(4) Murdoch University Electronic 
Journal of Law 1; Ben Heraghty, ‘Defender of the Faith? The Role of the Attorney-General in 
Defending the High Court’ (2002) 28 Monash University Law Review 206; John Hatzistergos, 
‘The Evolving Office of the New South Wales Attorney General’ (2012) 86 Australian Law 
Journal 192. Defending the judiciary is regarded by some as a role that should be assumed by 
the Judicial Conference of Australia or the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration. 
Others have expressed doubts about the capacity of these bodies to discharge such a role: 
Nicholson, above n 83, 17; Kenny, above n 21, 222. There is also disagreement over the 
circumstances in which the judiciary should be defended. The issues are canvassed at length 
in James Plunkett, ‘The Role of the Attorney-General in Defending the Judiciary’ (2010) 19 
Journal of Judicial Administration 160. 
109 Of course judges still do not comment on cases they have adjudicated. 
110 A notable example is Chief Justice Nicholson, who assumed responsibility to defend the 
Family Court from unwarranted public attack: Alastair Nicholson, ‘Family Law in the 
Looking Glass’ (Speech delivered at the Annual Family Law One-Day Seminar, NSW Young 
Lawyers, Sydney, 10 March 2001) 8 <http://www.familycourt.gov.au/wps/ 
wcm/resources/file/ebb86f0486b6b71/younglawyers.pdf>. More recently, Justice Whelan, 
former head of the Adult Parole Board, gave a radio interview in which he defended the 
Board following the release of a scathing report by Justice Callinan: Adrian Lowe, ‘Parole 
Board Hits Back over Ian Callinan’s Scathing Report’, The Age (Melbourne), 22 August 2013 
<http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/parole-board-hits-back-over-ian-callinans-scathing-report 
-20130822-2sclg.html>. It may also be appropriate for a Chief Justice or a court’s public 
liaison officer to contact the media to point out an instance of inaccurate reporting and to 
request a correction. 
111 See, eg, Harber Phillips, above n 106; B Teague, ‘The Courts, the Media and the 
Community — a Victorian Perspective’ (1995) 5 Journal of Judicial Administration 22; 
Kenneth Hayne, ‘Let Justice Be Done without the Heavens Falling’ (2001) 27 Monash 
University Law Review 12; Sackville, above n 86. 
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A multiplicity of motives may underlie the courts’ heightened preparedness to 
assist the media. It may emanate from a belief that the media are a ‘public of 
the court in their own right with legitimate needs to be satisfied’112 or that the 
media have a positive educative role to play and that the courts have an 
obligation to assist them to discharge it.113 It may emanate from a view that 
public confidence can be won and maintained only if the judges make more 
effort to communicate via the media. As Justice McGarvie stated:  
There is a great paradox in the Australian judicial scene today. While 
opinion is unanimous that the judicial system must have the confidence of 
the community and that its real, as distinct from its formal, authority comes 
from that confidence, practically nothing is done to provide the public with 
the information from which that confidence would grow.114 
Alternatively, it may stem from a conviction that ‘the courts must do this 
because Australians have a democratic right to be told what the courts are 
doing’.115 On a less lofty note, it may simply represent a judicial capitulation 
to the age of consumerism or a collective judicial resignation to the reality 
that the media is the primary interface between the courts and the public and 
that assistance should be provided to reporters in the hope that this will reduce 
the incidence of inaccurate, sensational, unfair or unduly critical reporting.  
Whatever the motive, many Australian courts have adopted measures that are 
designed to assist the media to report the work of the courts. Most Australian 
courts have appointed public information officers (PIOs).116 This has 
generated debate as to the precise role of PIOs: do they primarily exist to 
benefit the court or to assist the media? If the former, then PIOs are open to 
the criticism that they are ‘spin doctors’ for the courts.117 If they are 
facilitators for the media, this creates a potential for the media to become 
unduly reliant on their assistance, to the point where the media loses control 
                                                 
112 Parker, above n 21, 19. 
113 See McLachlin, above n 73. See also John Doyle, ‘The Well-Tuned Cymbal’ in H 
Cunningham (ed), Fragile Bastion (Judicial Commission of New South Wales, 1997) 
<http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/education-monographs-1/monograph1/fbdoyle. 
htm>. 
114 McGarvie, above n 22, 267. 
115 Doyle, above n 15, 26.  
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different title. See R D Nicholson, ‘Judicial Independence and the Conduct of Media 
Relations by Courts’ (1993) 2 Journal of Judicial Administration 207; M E J Black, ‘Letting 
the Public Know — the Educative Role of the Courts’ (1994) 1(2) Canberra Law Review 165, 
170–2; Jane Johnston, ‘The Court–Media Interface: Bridging the Divide’ (2008) 30(1) 
Australian Journalism Review 27. 
117 Brennan, above n 108, 40. 
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of the news agenda.118 Other forms of curial assistance include: publishing 
guidelines for reporting for the benefit of the media;119 providing reporters 
with special seating in courtrooms;120 permitting representatives of the news 
media to be present at hearings held in camera;121 providing online access to 
listings of cases; and adopting a generous attitude to the media’s standing to 
challenge orders that, if made, would derogate from open justice.122  
Many superior courts provide the media with judgment summaries to aid 
accurate reporting of significant or high-profile cases, and some courts, such 
as the Supreme Court of Victoria, publish regular sentencing summaries. 
Courts in overseas jurisdictions have gone even further. The Supreme Court 
of Canada has a procedure in place whereby the President of the Canadian 
Parliamentary Press Gallery can request a lock up in advance of a Supreme 
Court judgment.123 The Netherlands has dedicated press judges who are 
responsible for speaking about cases and judgments on behalf of the court.124 
To the extent that there is a high degree of dependency by the media on the 
extra judicial information that courts release, there is a danger that court 
reporting will become susceptible to influence by official sources, to the 
detriment of independent investigatory journalism.125 Lest it be thought that 
these forms of assistance have given journalists trouble-free access to the 
courts, it should be noted that many journalists still claim that they experience 
great difficulty in gaining access to information, particularly documents on 
the court record.126 
                                                 
118 These issues are explored at length in Johnston, above n 116. 
119 These guidelines assist the media to comply with the law by drawing their attention to the 
legal restrictions on covering the courts, such as suppression orders and contempt of court. 
120 Some courts provide the media with their own room, which has audio and video feed from 
the courtroom. 
121 See, eg, R v Waterfield [1975] 2 All ER 40. 
122 See, eg, Re Bromfield, Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte West Australian Newspapers Ltd 
(1991) 6 WAR 153. 
123 See Supreme Court of Canada, Resources for Media Procedure for Lock-Ups <http://www. 
scc-csc.gc.ca/media/decisions/lu-hc-eng.asp>. This procedure was adopted by the Australian 
High Court on one occasion: Dawson, above n 106, 25. 
124 De Rechtspraak, Press Guidelines (2013) <http://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/Publications/ 
Documents/pressguideline.pdf>. Press judges do not speak about cases or judgments in which 
they themselves have been involved. See Gies, above n 80. Gies notes the conflict over who is 
best placed to act as the guardian of the courts: a judge with legal expertise or a 
communications professional with media expertise: at 468. 
125 Gies, above n 80, 472. Gies notes that this source dependency is well documented in 
journalist/ police relations: at 457. 
126 Anecdotal accounts of such difficulties have been published by the Australia’s Right to 
Know Coalition: Prue Innes (Chair) and Australia’s Right to Know Coalition, Report of the 
Review of Suppression Orders and The Media’s Access to Court Documents and Information 
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Recently, courts have come under increasing pressure to allow journalists to 
tweet or live blog from within the courtroom, thereby enabling them to report 
on court cases in real time. Journalists argue that this ensures their right to 
report, which is a critical application of the principle of open justice. Whether 
journalists should be permitted to tweet or blog was initially a matter for the 
presiding judge in the case in which the request was made, in the exercise of 
his or her inherent or implied powers. Judicial responses were varied and 
inconsistent. While Cowdroy J allowed journalists to tweet from the Federal 
Court in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd,127 they were not permitted to 
tweet from the High Court during the hearing of the appeal in that case. 
Journalists were also warned by the Magistrate not to tweet in the Melbourne 
Magistrates’ Court during Simon Artz’s committal hearing in late 2011,128 as 
the Magistrate was concerned that statements made during the hearing might 
subsequently be suppressed or objected to and was anxious to ensure that they 
would not already have been tweeted.  
Today, most courts have either developed policies on the use of live, text-
based communications from within the courtroom or are in the process of 
doing so. For example, the United Kingdom Supreme Court generally permits 
tweeting from the courtroom provided it is unobtrusive and does not disrupt 
proceedings.129 Other courts in England and Wales are governed by the 
Practice Guidance issued by the Lord Justice in December 2011,130 paragraph 
10 of which states: 
It is presumed that a representative of the media or a legal commentator 
using live, text-based communications from court does not pose a danger of 
interference to the proper administration of justice in the individual case. 
This is because the most obvious purpose of permitting the use of live, text-
                                                                                                                    
(13 November 2008). For similar comments in respect of United Kingdom courts see Mike 
Dodd, ‘Open and Shut Justice’ (Paper presented at Justice Wide Open, Centre of Law, Justice 
and Journalism, City University London, 29 February 2012) <http://www.scribd.com/ 
doc/97591726/Justice-Wide-Open-Mike-Dodd-Open-and-Shut-Justice>; Heather Brooke, 
‘Secret Justice’ (Paper presented at Justice Wide Open, Centre of Law, Justice and 
Journalism, City University London, 29 February 2012) <http:// 
www.scribd.com/doc/97590479/Justice-Wide-Open-Heather-Brooke-Secret-Justice>. 
127 [2010] FCA 24 [4]. 
128 Simon Artz was a policeman who stood accused of leaking details of a counter terror raid to 
The Australian newspaper in 2009. 
129 Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Policy on the Use of Live Text-Based 
Communications From Court <http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/live-text-based-comms 
.pdf>. 
130 Lord Judge, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Practice Guidance: The Use of 
Live Text-Based Forms of Communication (Including Twitter) from Court for the Purposes of 
Fair and Accurate Reporting (December 2011) <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/ 
JCO/Documents/Guidance/ltbc-guidance-dec-2011.pdf>. 
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based communications would be to enable the media to produce fair and 
accurate reports of the proceedings. As such, a representative of the media 
or a legal commentator who wishes to use live, text-based communications 
from court may do so without making an application to the court.131 
New South Wales also takes a permissive approach.132 Other jurisdictions are 
less generous.133 
While use of social media within the courtroom allows journalists to impart a 
sense of immediacy to their reporting of a case, it also has a number of 
potential hazards. Some of these hazards are peculiar to social media, while 
others simply add to the risks that exist with all forms of reporting. These 
hazards arise from the fact that: 
• The brevity of tweets makes it difficult to convey evidence and 
arguments accurately;134 
• Evidence that is challenged and subsequently ruled inadmissible or 
corrected may have already been tweeted/ posted; 
• The making of a suppression order will be rendered futile if the 
information sought to be suppressed has already been tweeted; 
• A witness who is sitting outside a courtroom awaiting their turn to 
testify might become acquainted with evidence as it is being given by 
another witness and adjust their own testimony accordingly; 
• In the heat of the moment, reporters might breach statutory 
prohibitions on the naming of parties, or tweet information that has 
been disclosed to the court during a voir dire in the absence of the 
jury.135 
                                                 
131 It should be noted that the Guidance only permits text-based forms of communication. 
Photographs and audio recordings are not permitted in the courtroom. 
132 Court Security Act 2005 (NSW) s 9A; Court Security Regulations 2011 (NSW) reg 6B. 
133 The Canadian Press, ‘Quebec Courtrooms to Become Twitter-Free Zones’, 14 April 2013 
<http://www2.macleans.ca/2013/04/14/quebec-courtrooms-to-become-twitter-free-zones/>. 
134 Judith Townend, ‘Opinion: Legal and Ethical Issues for Televising and Tweeting Court’ on 
Inforrm (24 April 2012) <http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/04/24/opinion-legal-and-ethical-
issues-for-televising-and-tweeting-court-judith-townend/>.  
135 An experienced journalist will know not to do this, but untrained or inexperienced court 
reporters may not be aware of the danger and will not have the benefit of having their social 
media reports checked before publication. 
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Some of these pitfalls may affect the fairness, accuracy or legality of a report 
and therefore endanger the media organisation’s protection from defamation 
and contempt liability. In a worst case scenario, they may jeopardise the trial. 
It is interesting to note that while Justice Kirby supported the rendering of 
judicial assistance to the media, he warned that ‘there are dangers in playing 
the media’s game’, because its mission ‘will never be the same as that of the 
judges’.136 While many have lauded the courts for implementing the 
abovementioned forms of judicial assistance, Schulz’s research results 
indicate that the assistance has not improved the standard of reporting, leading 
her to suggest that the judiciary should ‘avoid reliance on the media as a 
major conduit for communication with the public or to facilitate community 
understanding’.137 
D An Evolving Intermediary between the Media and 
the Courts: Litigants’ ‘Litigation PR’  
When it comes to reporting on court proceedings, the garnering of information 
by journalists has traditionally been direct and first hand. Reporters sit in 
court, listen and take notes as a case unfolds, search documents on the court 
record at the court registry, then write or broadcast their reports. However, it 
is becoming increasingly common for litigants to use the media as part of 
their litigation strategy.138 The formal practice by or on behalf of litigants of 
‘litigation PR’ has been described as 
managing the communications process during the course of any legal 
dispute or adjudicatory proceeding so as to affect the outcome or its impact 
on the client’s overall reputation.139 
Litigation PR has been a feature of the litigation process in the United States 
for some time and is gaining popularity in the United Kingdom, New Zealand 
and Australia.140 It is generally used in high profile civil litigation involving 
commercial litigants. To the extent that a reporter gleans his or her 
                                                 
136 Kirby, above n 87, 242. 
137 Schulz, above n 89, 223. Contra Schulz citing Jane Johnston, Communicating Courts: An 
Analysis of the Changing Interface between Court and the Media (PhD thesis, Griffith 
University, 2004); Jane Johnston, ‘Public Relations in the Courts: A New Frontier’ (2001) 
28(1) Australian Journal of Communication 109. 
138 See Simon Mount, ‘The Interface between the Media and the Law’ [2006] New Zealand 
Law Review 413, 418–9 for some New Zealand examples. 
139 James F Haggerty, In the Court of Public Opinion: Winning Your Case with Public 
Relations (Wiley, 2003) 2. 
140 See, eg, Mount, above n 138, 432–6. 
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information about a proceeding from a litigant’s PR team, litigation PR 
interposes an intermediary between the courts and the media. One reason why 
reporters might be tempted to garner their information in this way is that 
newspapers can no longer afford to allow their journalists to spend days in 
court; it is simply too expensive in this era of declining newspaper circulation. 
Therefore, in long and complex cases, the media need to rely on someone to 
supply them with information. In cases where litigation PR is employed, this 
role is assumed by the parties’ PR teams.141  
A problem faced by reporters and parties is that, even if reporters do attend 
court, they may not see witnesses undergoing an examination in chief. This is 
because witnesses often give their evidence in chief by affidavit. If this is the 
case, reporters will only see witnesses being cross examined. This casts the 
witnesses in the worst possible light.142 While it is usually possible for a 
reporter to obtain a copy of the examination in chief — at least once it has 
been deployed in the proceedings — in a complex case this document may be 
very lengthy. A litigation PR person representing the party for whom the 
witness gave evidence can take a reporter through it quickly.143  
Litigation PR has a potentially damaging effect on the quality of reporting, 
since it means that information about the courts is being mediated by persons 
whose task it is to put their client’s case to the media in the most favourable 
light, in the hope that the ensuing coverage will preserve their client’s 
reputation in the court of public opinion.144 This, in turn, affects the extent to 
which the aims of open justice can be achieved. It bolsters the argument for 
judicial assistance to be given to the media so that reliance on a litigant is less 
enticing to the media in this era of diminishing editorial budgets.145 Even 
more fundamentally, if, as a result of pre-trial publicity, the case never goes to 
trial, it implies that the case was more appropriately decided by the court of 
public opinion.146 This arguably usurps the role of the court. 
                                                 
141 A similar role might be assumed by a party’s legal representatives: ibid 432–6.  
142 Richard Elsen, ‘The PRs Invade the Courtroom’ (2001) 12 British Journalism Review 39, 
40. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Chris Sheedy, ‘Courting Public Opinion’ (2006) Management Today (Australian Institute of 
Management) 25 <http://svc031.wic011v.server-web.com/DisplayStory.asp?ID=592>. 
145 Although it has already been suggested that an overreliance on judicial assistance can itself 
jeopardise independent journalism. 
146 Haggerty, above n 139, 12. 
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V THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND THE 
PUBLIC 
The relationship between the media and the public is complex and subject to 
differing interpretations. It has implications for open justice, as decisions 
concerning which cases are reported, how they are reported and the 
commentary that accompanies a report shape public perceptions of the work 
of the courts and therefore impact on the educative effect of the principle. 
A The Dual Role of the Media 
As observed above, when appearing in court to seek leave to inspect 
documents on the court record or to resist an application for an order that 
would diminish open justice, media organisations inevitably take the high 
moral ground and hold themselves out as performing a public service by 
arguing that they should be free to convey to the public that which the public 
has a right to know. In formal judicial proceedings, judges generally accept 
this argument at face value. 
However, the position is more obscure than the media’s arguments would 
suggest. The complexity arises from the two-sided nature of the media. In the 
words of C P Scott, former editor of the Manchester Guardian, written in 
1921: 
A newspaper has two sides to it. It is a business, like any other, and has to 
pay in the material sense in order to live. But it is much more than a 
business; it is an institution; it reflects and it influences the life of the 
community … it has, therefore, a moral as well as a material existence, and 
its character and influence are in the main determined by the balance of 
these two forces.147 
This two-sided nature of the media pervades court reporting. It means that 
while media organisations undoubtedly endeavour to report cases of 
significance to the public, it is also true that they are driven by less lofty 
considerations, namely the need to make a profit in order to survive.148 The 
need of media organisations to allocate their limited resources efficiently and 
to sell copy or attract audiences means that they must be selective about 
which cases they report and must report them in an abridged form in a manner 
most likely to capture and sustain the public’s attention. This renders it 
                                                 
147 This quote is reproduced in R Finkelstein, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Media 
and Media Regulation (2012) [2.52]. The speech of C P Scott can be read in its entirety at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2002/nov/29/1>. 
148 See Mount, above n 138, 415–6. 
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inevitable that the media will have a preference for cases that involve 
celebrities or high profile sportspeople, natural disasters, unusual occurrences 
and gruesome crimes against the person, over complex and dry decisions in 
fields such as constitutional law, taxation or trusts, notwithstanding that the 
latter decisions may have a more direct impact on the lives of members of the 
public. It is often perceived as a choice between being ‘worthy and dull’ and 
going out of business, or offering ‘a mix of news in all its forms and 
entertainment’.149 The media are also selective about the way in which they 
report cases. As noted earlier, commercial imperatives impel the media to 
focus on outcomes, rather than the process by which a decision was reached, 
notwithstanding that it is the ratio decidendi that forms the law and therefore 
has the greatest implications for the public.150 
Although judges are cognisant of the harsh commercial realities that confront 
the media, their reactions to it vary. For example, Lord Hoffmann stated that 
the media’s ‘motives in a market economy cannot be expected to be unalloyed 
by considerations of commercial advantage’.151 Chief Justice Spigelman was 
less sympathetic, stating that the public interest arguments advanced by the 
media should be taken with a grain of salt: 
When the media come before the Court invoking high-minded principles of 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press or the principle of open justice, it is 
always salutary to bear in mind the commercial interest the media has in 
maximising its access to private information about individuals.152 
B The Extent to which Media Coverage of the Courts 
Shapes Public Opinion 
The media, the courts and the public have divergent views regarding the 
extent to which media coverage of court cases shapes the public’s opinion of 
the work of the courts. In keeping with their insistence that they serve the 
public, the media are likely to claim that they select and cover court cases in 
which they believe the public has an independent interest.153 However, it has 
                                                 
149 Solicitor-General for New Zealand v Fairfax New Zealand Ltd HC WN CIV 2008-485-
000705 (10 October 2008). 
150 As Sir Gerard Brennan stated: ‘It is in the reasons for judgment rather than in the formal 
judgment or order of the court that one must search to find what the court is doing’: Sir 
Gerard Brennan, ‘The Third Branch and the Fourth Estate’ (Lecture delivered at the Faculty 
of Law, University College, Dublin, 22 April 1997) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/ 
publications/speeches/former-justices/brennanj/brennanj_irish.htm>. 
151 R v Central Independent Television plc [1994] Fam 192; [1994] 3 WLR 20. 
152 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court (2005) 62 NSWLR 512 [76]. 
153 Of course it is well understood that the media have a propensity to confuse the ‘public 
interest’ with what the public is interested in. 
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been argued that the media actually construct and generate public opinion, 
rather than reacting to opinions and preferences that have been independently 
formed by members of the community. In this way, the media actually dictate 
public perceptions of the courts.154 Schulz describes the result as media 
constructed community concern.155 In a similar vein, Gies doubts whether 
media portrayal of judges and their work can be assumed to be a ‘reliable 
barometer of public opinion’.156 In any event, public opinion is not 
homogeneous, but complex and diverse.157 
For their part, courts clearly proceed on the assumption that jurors are 
susceptible to believing what they read and hear in the media and have 
applied this assumption in cases of sub judice and scandalising contempt. 
Since jurors are drawn from the general populace, one might suppose that 
courts would ascribe the same degree of susceptibility to all members of the 
public.158 This may account for the courts’ increased willingness to assist the 
media to report cases accurately. However, studies suggest that jurors may not 
be as influenced by media coverage of a case as the courts have supposed,159 
and many have found that the public has a significant level of distrust of the 
media.160 If this is the case, it may be that many members of the public do not 
passively accept the media’s verdict on the shortcomings of the judicial 
system, thus suggesting that the media is not necessarily a surrogate for public 
opinion. 
                                                 
154 Justice John Basten, ‘Court and Media Relationships’ (Speech delivered at the National 
Judicial College, Beijing, 30 October – 4 November 2005) <http://www. 
lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_basten301005>. See also 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, ‘Sentencing and Juries’ (Issues Paper No 27, 
June 2006) [3.20]. 
155 Schultz, above n 89, 227. 
156 Gies, above n 80, 456. 
157 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 154 [3.11]. 
158 The general public, however, is in a different position from jurors. Jurors sit in court and 
hear the case first hand; indeed, that is what they are required to do and is precisely what the 
law of contempt seeks to ensure is done. Open justice, in its modern form, is an exemplar of 
the opposite scenario, namely, that the public obtains its information about judicial 
proceedings from the media. 
159 Warren Young, Neil Cameron and Yvette Tinsley, Juries in Criminal Trials, New Zealand 
Law Commission Preliminary Paper No 37 (1999); M Chesterman, J Chan and S Hampton, 
Managing Prejudicial Publicity: An Empirical Study of Criminal Jury Trials in New South 
Wales (Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, 2001). 
160 See, eg, the Edelman Trust Barometer 2012 Annual Global Study, which revealed that 
public trust in the media is low compared with other sectors (although it had risen slightly in 
the last year) and that the Australian public trusts the media to a significantly lesser extent 
than citizens in most other countries. Recent and reputable surveys of public opinion of media 
performance were summarised in Finkelstein, above n 147 [4.9]–[4.81]. This report confirmed 
that the Australian media has poor public standing, with the exception of the ABC, which is 
held in high esteem. 
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However, the fact that public confidence in the media is low does not 
necessarily negate the argument that the public is susceptible to media 
influence regarding the work of the courts. Unless members of the public have 
attended a judicial proceeding in person161 or had information relayed to them 
by someone who has, or have made independent inquiries about a case (such 
as reading the judgment or sentencing remarks that have been uploaded onto 
the internet by the court or by the Australasian Legal Information Institute 
(‘Austlii’)) they have no other basis upon which to form their opinions about 
the courts and their work. At most, they can suspend their judgment. To the 
extent that media reporting is inaccurate, superficial, sensational or biased, 
this does not augur well for the educative aim of open justice. 
VI THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COURTS AND THE 
PUBLIC 
To this point this article has focused on the role of the media in giving 
practical substance to the principle of open justice. This section grapples with 
the role of the courts vis-à-vis the public. To what extent, if any, do courts 
have a responsibility to make their work directly known to the public?162  
It is possible that, when pressed, some judges might maintain that their sole 
responsibility is to do justice in the cases over which they preside rather than 
to educate the public. That is, they might regard open justice as a passive 
concept which obliges them to be exposed to public view and public reports, 
but which does not require them to take positive steps to explain themselves 
or to make their work known.163 However, the initiatives adopted by courts in 
recent years indicate that most judges believe that they should accept some 
responsibility for educating the public about their work.164 Some judges may 
think that the news media are most suited to undertake this role and that their 
own collective judicial energy is best expended in assisting the media to 
discharge it. Others may have a conviction that courts are best placed to do so 
                                                 
161 See Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack, ‘The Work of the Australian Judiciary: Public 
and Judicial Attitudes’ (2010) 20 Journal of Judicial Administration 3. This article draws on 
the 2007 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, which found, inter alia, that very few 
Australians have any firsthand experience of the courts, thus suggesting that most Australians 
derive their information about the courts from the media or from relayed accounts of others’ 
experiences. 
162 The ‘public’ that the judiciary serves is not confined to the media-viewing/reading/  
listening public, but encompasses all members of the community, not all of whom may be 
represented by the media: Kenny, above n 21, 209. 
163 Justice Doyle notes the existence of this view, although he does not agree with it: Doyle, 
above n 15, 27. 
164 Parker, above n 21, 146.  
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and that courts should therefore develop communications strategies that are 
aimed at building a direct relationship with the public.165 This conviction may 
also betray a belief that speaking to the media is not necessarily the same as 
speaking to the community.166  
Whichever view a judge holds, the reality is that dwindling newspaper 
circulation and the consequent fall in profits has led to a significant decline in 
the number of specialised, experienced court reporters.167 As a result, the 
courts are ‘losing the main source of dedicated and coherent media coverage 
of court proceedings and justice sector matters’.168 Citizen journalists are 
inadequate replacements, as courts cannot assume that they possess the same 
level of training, expertise, professionalism and knowledge of contempt law 
and suppression orders as that possessed by dedicated court reporters. 
Moreover, they are not subject to layers of editorial control. Thus it seems 
inevitable that it will increasingly fall to the courts to directly inform the 
public about how they operate. 
A Recent Technological Developments 
The issue of whether the courts should endeavour to develop a more direct 
relationship with the public has not been a pressing one because, until 
recently, courts have not had the means of doing so, except in those 
circumstances where members of the public have made the effort to attend the 
courts. In that event, most courts offer an array of pamphlets, touch screen 
information and public tours, and frequently host school groups. They also 
participate in events such as Law Week by holding mock cases and 
conducting question and answer sessions with members of the public. 
Three relatively recent technological developments have made it possible for 
the public to experience a more direct form of access to the courts that has not 
been feasible since the bygone era when people had the time and inclination 
                                                 
165 For an example of the latter view see Mason, above n 9, 11; Black, above n 116, 168; 
Williams, above n 62, 15; Daniel Stepniak, ‘Court TV — Coming to an Internet Browser near 
You’ (2006) 15 Journal of Judicial Administration 218; Lord Neuberger, above n 19. 
166 Nicholson, above n 83, 18. 
167 Chief Justice Warren has noted that at the beginning of 2012, ‘the ABC halved its court 
coverage commitment to one reporter’ and that ‘very senior and experienced legal affairs 
reporters at the Age and Herald Sun retired’: Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, ‘Open Justice in 
the Technological Age’ (Speech delivered at the 2013 Redmond Barry Lecture, State Library 
of Victoria, 21 October 2013) <http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/find/publications 
/speech+-+open+justice+in+the+technological+age>. 
168 Ibid. 
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to attend proceedings in person.169 If the courts embrace these developments it 
will mean that they have come full circle, although the return will be to a 
virtual presence, rather than a face to face one. 
1 The Introduction of Television 
First, the introduction of television in the 1950s made it possible for judicial 
proceedings to be conveyed first hand and in full to the viewing public. While 
a media organisation that provided ‘gavel to gavel’ coverage would still be 
acting as an intermediary between the court and the public, its role would 
more closely approximate that of a conduit rather than a processor, interpreter 
or packager of information, although there would still be some selectivity in 
terms of camera angles among other things. By contrast, if the media were 
free to make their own decisions as to how they used footage of judicial 
proceedings, they would likely broadcast short excerpts, which would have 
the potential to be as selective, mediated and out of context as a summary of a 
case in the print media. This would not bring about the direct contact between 
the courts and the public that unedited coverage can deliver. These problems 
would be minimised if the media were required to abide by strict rules as to 
how footage of the courts could be used.170 
Unlike courts in the United States, Canada, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom,171 Australian courts have persisted in their disinclination to allow 
their proceedings to be televised. The result is that judicial proceedings in 
Australia have been televised only spasmodically, on an ad hoc basis. This 
reluctance to allow cameras into the courtroom has meant that the electronic 
media have been relegated to conveying information about judicial 
proceedings to the public through the spoken word of court reporters (who 
usually deliver their reports from the street outside the court), in much the 
                                                 
169 Although members of the public are now less likely to attend judicial proceedings in which 
they have no personal stake, it remains the case that high profile criminal cases attract the 
public to the courtroom. A recent example is the murder trial of Gerard Baden-Clay in the 
Supreme Court in Brisbane, where additional courtrooms had to be opened to house the public 
and a ticketing system introduced to prevent overcrowding: Daniel Winters, ‘Baden-Clay 
Murder Trial: Large Crowds in Court Evidence of a Healthy Legal System, Top Barrister 
Says’, The ABC (online) 11 July 2014 <https://au.news.yahoo.com/a/24442435/baden-clay-
murder-trial-large-crowds-in-court-evidence-of-a-healthy-legal-system-top-barrister-says/>. 
170 The media are subject to stringent rules regarding their broadcasts of federal and state 
parliaments. 
171 The United Kingdom has only recently reversed the ban on the recording and broadcasting 
of proceedings of a court or tribunal that was enshrined in s 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1925 (UK) (with the exception of the Supreme Court) and s 9 of the Contempt of Court Act 
1981 (UK). The Crime and Courts Act 2013 (UK) confers power on the courts to lift the 
current restrictions on filming and broadcasting and allow filming under controlled 
circumstances: s 32.  
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same way as the press do through the printed word. This is notwithstanding 
the fact that the aural and visual nature of broadcasting would give the public 
a more direct sense of what has transpired than a verbal report in a highly 
summarised form.172  
Australian courts justify this stance on the basis that televised coverage entails 
greater risks. Concern has centred on the potential for cameras to disrupt 
proceedings and detrimentally affect the participants and the evidence, 
thereby altering both the nature and conduct of the proceedings. While some 
of these objections remain valid, others are becoming less convincing.  
In light of the fact that members of the public acquire most of their news 
through electronic media, the electronic media regard it as somewhat ironic 
that they are not able to utilise the principle of open justice to their advantage 
to the same extent as the print media. Differences of opinion have been 
expressed as to whether open justice requires the court to permit the broadcast 
of court proceedings. As recently as 2009, the Court of Appeal of Western 
Australia opined that no such requirement existed: 
The ordinary rule [that courts conduct their proceedings publicly and in open 
view] is satisfied if persons are free to attend court and report on the 
proceedings without restriction; it does not require the court to permit the 
broadcast (by television or otherwise) of court proceedings. Whether it 
justifies it is a different policy (not legal) question.173 
Others claim that the principle of open justice does require cameras to be 
permitted in the courtrooms, except where their presence would interfere with 
the proper administration of justice.174  
It is interesting to speculate on whether any liberalisation of the courts’ 
restrictive stance would be matched by an interest on the part of the electronic 
media in providing extended broadcasts of judicial proceedings.175 It is 
unlikely that media outlets would seek to broadcast cases in their entirety, 
even if this were permitted, since ‘gavel to gavel’ coverage is time consuming 
                                                 
172 Stepniak, above n 165, 222. 
173 Re Hogan; Ex parte West Australian Newspapers Ltd [2009] WASCA 221 [31]. 
174 Edward Thomson, ‘Does the Open Justice Principle Require Cameras to Be Permitted in the 
Courtroom and the Broadcasting of Legal Proceedings?’ (2011) 3(2) Journal of Media Law 
211. 
175 See Jane Johnston, ‘Setting the Table Doesn’t Mean the Guests Will Come to Dinner: 
Televised Courts in Australia’ (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International 
Communication Association, New York, May 2005) <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/ 
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and prosaic, and would not sustain the interest of audiences.176 The media’s 
main interest will likely lie in televising judgments and sentencing remarks in 
high-profile cases.  
2 The Advent of the Internet 
Second, the advent of the internet has made it possible for courts to bypass the 
mainstream media and to be publishers in their own right. Courts are now in a 
position to disseminate textual, audio and visual information about their 
history, personnel, structure and jurisdiction, webcast their proceedings and 
publish their judgments and sentencing remarks almost immediately and in 
their entirety directly to the public. Most courts have developed websites that 
provide a general introduction to the court, which often includes a brief 
history of the court, a description of its jurisdiction and place in the court 
hierarchy, a visual tour and biographical information about the judges. These 
websites help the public to glean general information about a court, as 
information of this nature has no news value and is therefore unlikely to find 
its way into the media.177 
To date, most courts have not exhibited a great deal of enthusiasm for 
webcasting their cases, using webcasting only on an ad hoc basis and 
generally only on ceremonial occasions, such as the admission of lawyers or 
the welcoming or farewelling of judges. However, there are indications that 
this is changing, at least in relation to the superior courts. For example, the 
Victorian Supreme Court has a sentencing and judgments portal on which 
certain sentences and judgments can be heard or viewed on demand. The 
opening addresses of certain class actions which involve large sections of the 
community — mainly trials arising out of the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires 
— are also available on the Court’s website. In 2013, the High Court 
announced that it would begin to publish on its website audio-visual 
recordings of Full Court hearings heard in Canberra, other than applications 
for special leave. Recordings are made available within one business day after 
a hearing in order to ‘allow for vetting of recordings to avoid the possibility of 
information which should not be published being published — such as a name 
which is the subject of a publication constraint’.178 Other courts are disposed 
to use the opportunities afforded by the internet but have been impeded in 
doing so by budgetary constraints. For example, the Chief Justice of Western 
                                                 
176 It is possible that this situation will change as digitisation technology spawns more 
television and radio channels, since in this emerging era of greater spectrum abundance, the 
demand for content will intensify and the need to attract a mass audience will abate. 
177 Williams, above n 62, 17. 
178 High Court of Australia, Press Release, October 2013 <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/ 
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Australia recently expressed his deep concern at a decision of the Western 
Australian Attorney-General to ‘stop a project which would allow the 
Supreme Court to web stream cases live to the public’.179 
The Chief Justice of the Victorian Supreme Court recently announced a 
proposal to have a regular blog written for the court website by a retired 
judge, or perhaps someone from the ranks of the media or academia, ‘to create 
greater community understanding around controversial issues’.180 
Superior courts routinely upload the full text of their judgments and 
sentencing remarks onto court websites and/or supply them to Austlii.181 
Courts have accommodated themselves to the internet by numbering the 
paragraphs in their judgments and assigning each case a media neutral 
citation. While the fact that judgments are available free of charge to the 
general public makes the courts more accessible to the community,182 the 
sheer number and complexity of cases that pass through the courts each day, 
coupled with the wealth of judgments that are uploaded, makes it likely that 
the public will continue to rely on the media to do the ‘hard yards’ of sifting 
through and reporting newsworthy cases.183 However, it is open to the courts 
to use social media as a means of alerting followers to significant cases.  
3 The Advent of Social Media 
Courts around the world are currently wrestling with whether they should 
have an official presence on social media and, if so, how they will use this 
technology to communicate with the public.184 Some of the questions that 
courts must resolve when deciding whether to use social media include: what 
types of content should be posted and how frequently; which social media 
platforms the court should use; and whether social media should be used for 
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two-way communication.185 The Supreme Court of Victoria has a Twitter feed 
and a presence on Facebook which are used to draw the attention of its 
followers to significant judgments, sentences, practice notes and webcasts, 
among other things.  
Judges face the additional challenge of deciding whether it is appropriate for 
them to use social media in their professional or private capacity.186 Extra-
judicial comments on legal issues may result in allegations of apprehended 
bias being leveled against the judge, which may form the basis of an 
application to the judge to recuse himself or herself from a case or which may 
constitute the grounds for an appeal.187 
B Courts Should Take a Proactive Stance in Making 
Their Work Known to the Public 
Given the nature of the media’s modus operandi, discussed above, coupled 
with the decline in newspaper circulation and dedicated court reporters, courts 
should seize the opportunities afforded by these technological developments 
and attempt to instate a more direct relationship with the public. It is not 
suggested that courts should do this with a view to inviting the public to ‘have 
a say’ in how justice is administered. To invite such communication would 
suggest a two-way engagement with the community which hitherto has not 
characterised the work of the court. To conduct a two-way exchange with the 
public would be equally inappropriate today, despite the fact that modern 
technology can facilitate such a relationship. Clearly, the task of the courts is 
to apply the law to the cases that come before them, even if this produces a 
result that is favourable to an unpopular litigant or that appears to the 
layperson to be counterintuitive.188  
Rather, what is advocated is that courts take greater pains to make their work 
known to the public, provided this can be done without detriment to the 
administration of justice. This would expose the public to a wider variety of 
cases, give them a greater appreciation of the complexities of the issues that 
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arise for determination and assist them to understand that sentencing is not 
solely about punishment. Justice would be truly ‘seen to be done’. 
There are, however, some drawbacks to the proactive stance that is being 
urged on the courts in the interests of open justice. First, information made 
available by the courts over the internet is going to come to the attention only 
of those who actively seek it. It is not thrust upon people in the same way as 
media reports of court cases that appear in newspapers or on television or 
radio news broadcasts are.189 The media therefore remain in a stronger 
position vis-à-vis the public than the courts. By selecting the news that the 
public reads or views, they can impose unsolicited information on a passive 
audience. Thus it is likely that it will continue to be primarily through the 
media that the work of the courts will be made known to the wider public, at 
least for the foreseeable future.  
Second, although it would be inappropriate for courts to use new media to 
engage in a two-way conversation with the public regarding the 
administration of justice, members of the public who use social media may 
not be content to be the passive recipients of information. It will be interesting 
to see over time whether courts that have chosen to relate to the public 
through social media are able to maintain an appropriate distance from public 
opinion.  
Third, implicit in a proactive stance by the courts is an assumption that the 
‘disconnect’ between the courts and the public is attributable to an 
information deficit among the public which can be corrected by the courts 
taking steps to directly inform the public about their work. However, the 
solution may not be that simple. It may be unrealistic to expect the public to 
be able to understand complex decisions that are the product of years of 
accumulated legal precedent, just as it would be unrealistic to expect the 
public to comprehend a surgeon’s detailed explanation of an operation or an 
accountant’s description of a complex tax minimisation scheme. The 
difference, however, is that the courts’ legitimacy rests on public confidence 
in a way that other vocations do not.190 It has been suggested that judges 
should take steps to ensure that their judgments are ‘accessible through 
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effective language’ so as to secure an ‘effective interaction between language 
and the law’,191 but the extent to which this can be achieved is debatable. 
Nevertheless, the availability online of judgment summaries which are 
couched in less technical terms certainly assists the public to understand what 
the court has distilled as the essence of the decision. Moreover, webcasts of 
sentencing remarks — which are often the most reported and most 
controversial aspects of decisions — should be readily comprehensible to 
members of the public.  
Fourth, Gies claims that court-driven initiatives rest on the supposition that 
there is ‘a truthful way of portraying the work of judges’.192 However, she 
argues that there is controversy over ‘what exactly counts as complete and 
legitimate understanding’ and that people these days question the superiority 
of expert knowledge; indeed, they lack confidence in it. If so, this means that 
judges, not just journalists, ‘are inevitably selective in their reality claims’.193 
Be that as it may, courts cannot be responsible for how people react to their 
work. They can only work to ensure that the picture presented to the public is, 
from their perspective, as accurate as possible. 
VII CONCLUSION 
This article has considered the nature of the relationships between the courts 
and the media, the media and the public, and the courts and the public. It has 
demonstrated that these relationships are complex and reveal an interweaving 
of cause and effect. While the principle of open justice has spawned these 
relationships, the way in which they operate is capable of either enhancing or 
diminishing the aims of open justice. To the extent that the media act as an 
intermediary between the courts and the public, the value of open justice, and 
its capacity to achieve its purposes, is only as good as the quality of the 
reporting.  
While proactive behaviour on the part of courts is not a requirement of open 
justice, nor even one of its recognised manifestations, it is a strategy for 
maximising its benefits.194 For that reason, the forging of a direct, unmediated 
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engagement with the community merits serious consideration by the courts. 
The internet and social media have provided courts with the means of 
delivering a fuller and truer picture of their work to the public than the 
traditional media provide, and they should seize the opportunities to do so. 
The fact that they are reliant on an active, inquiring public to solicit this 
information should not dissuade them from pursuing this engagement. Indeed, 
the availability of this information may generate further interest.  
                                                                                                                    
Warren suggest that provision of such access by the courts has already become an application 
of the principle: Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, above n 167.  
